Cryptanalysis and improvement of several quantum private comparison
  protocols by Ji, Zhao-Xu et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
12
94
7v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
30
 D
ec
 20
19
Cryptanalysis and improvement of several quantum private
comparison protocols
Zhao-Xu Ji†, Pei-Ru Fan, Huan-Guo Zhang, Hou-Zhen Wang
Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, School of Cyber Science and
Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
†jizhaoxu@whu.edu.cn
Abstract
Recently, Wu et al. [Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58, 1854, (2019)]
found a serious information leakage problem in Ye and Ji’s quan-
tum private comparison protocol [Int. J. Theor. Phys. 56, 1517,
(2017)], that is, a malicious participant can steal another’s secret
data without being detected through an active attack means. In this
paper, we show that Wu et al.’s attack means is also effective for
several other existing protocols, including the ones proposed by Ji
et al. and Zha et al. [Commun. Theor. Phys. 65, 711, (2016) and
Int. J. Theor. Phys. 57, 3874, (2018)]. In addition, we propose
a passive attack means, which is different from Wu et al.’s active
attack in that the malicious participant can easily steal another’s
secret data only by using his own secret data after finishing the
protocol. Furthermore, we find that several other existing quan-
tum private comparison protocols also have such an information
leakage problem. In response to the problem, we propose a simple
solution, which is more efficient than the ones proposed by Wu et
al., because it does not consume additional classical and quantum
resources. We also make some comments on this problem.
Keywords: quantum information security, quantum cryptography,
quantum private comparison, information leakage problem, pas-
sive attack
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography is widely concerned because of
its unconditional security [1–3]. The difference between
quantum cryptography and classical cryptography is that
the security of the former is based on some principles of
quantum mechanics, while the latter is based on some as-
sumptions of computational complexity. A fascinating fea-
ture of quantum cryptography is that it enables users to
detect whether there is an eavesdropper in quantum chan-
nels during communications, which can not be done by
classical cryptography [2, 3]. With the rapid development
of quantum computers and quantum algorithms, the secu-
rity of classical cryptography has been severely challenged,
which makes the role of quantum cryptography in modern
cryptography more and more important [2, 3].
Since the birth of quantum cryptography, quantum key
distribution (QKD) has been one of the main research di-
rections in quantum cryptography domain [2]. Indeed, the
first quantum cryptography protocol is the QKD protocol
proposed by Bennett et al. in 1984, which is known as
BB84 protocol. QKD aims to generate random shared keys
between different users; combined with one-time pad en-
cryption, it can provide unconditional security for users.
Moreover, the decoy photon technology derived from QKD
has become one of the effective means for eavesdropping
checking [4–6].
Quantum private comparison (QPC), originated from
the famous “millionaires’ problem” [5–7], aims to judge
whether the date of at least two users who do not trust each
other are the same or not while maintaining data privacy
using some quantum mechanics laws. In fact, the compar-
ison of the equality of data is widely used in real life, in-
cluding secret bidding and auctions, secret ballot elections,
e-commerce, and data mining [2]. One of the common ap-
plications is the identification of a system for users, which
aims to judge whether the users’ secret information (e.g.,
password and fingerprint) is the same as the secret informa-
tion stored in the system. QPC can also solve the “Tierce´
problem”, which is also known as the “socialist million-
aires’ problem” [8].
After about ten years of development, QPC has attracted
extensive attention in academia. Many protocols have been
proposed based on different quantum states or different
quantum technologies [9–35]. Unfortunately, information
leakage often occurs; many existing QPC protocols have
been proved to be insecure [36–42]. Recently, Wu et al.
[42] pointed out that there is a serious information leak-
age problem in Ye et al.’s QPC protocol [43]; they showed
that one participant in the protocol can steal another’s se-
cret information through an active attack means. To solve
this problem, they put forward two solutions: One is to use
a QKD protocol to establish two new key sequences, and
use hash functions to complete a mutual authentication pro-
cess; the other is to use a QKD protocol to establish a new
key sequence and adopt unitary-operation-based symmet-
ric encryption technology. Although the two solutions en-
sure the security, however, they both greatly reduce the ef-
ficiency of the protocol. On the one hand, both solutions
use QKD to prepare additional keys, which obviously in-
creases resource consumption. On the other hand, the hash
functions and unitary operations need additional quantum
devices and technologies, which greatly reduces the feasi-
bility of the protocol. After all, Ye et al.’s protocol does not
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use any other quantum technology except for the necessary
ones such as the technology of preparing quantum states
and quantum measurement.
In this paper, we will show that the active attack means
proposed by Wu et al. is also effective for the protocols
presented in Refs. [44–46]. That is, these protocols are in-
secure under the attack. However, we will propose a passive
attack means to show that a malicious participant can easily
steal another’s secret data without using Wu et al.’s active
attack means. Specifically, after the end of the protocol, the
malicious participant can steal another’s secret data only by
using his own secret data. Moreover, we will point out that
the passive attack is effective not only for the protocols pre-
sented in Refs. [43–46], but also for the protocols presented
in Refs. [47, 48]. Finally, we will propose a simple and
effective solution to the information leakage problem and
make some comments. The rest of the paper is arranged as
follows: In Sec. 2, we review briefly the protocol proposed
by Ji and Ye [44]. In Sec. 3, we first take Ji and Ye’s pro-
tocol as an example to show that Wu et al.’s active attack
is also effective to the protocols presented in Refs. [44–46],
and then we describe our passive attack means. Sec. 5 intro-
duces our solution to the information leakage problem and
gives our comments. Sec. 6 summarizes this paper.
2 Review on Ji and Ye’s protocol
Let us review the QPC protocol proposed by Ji and Ye
[44]. Their protocol uses the highly entangled six-qubit
genuine state as information carriers, whose expression is
given by
|Υ〉 = 1√
32
[
|000000〉 + |111111〉+ |000011〉
+ |111100〉+ |000101〉 + |111010〉
+ |000110〉+ |111001〉 + |001001〉
+ |110110〉+ |001111〉 + |110000〉
+ |010001〉+ |101110〉 + |010010〉
+ |101101〉+ |011000〉 + |100111〉
+ |011101〉+ |100010〉 − (|010100〉
+ |101011〉+ |010111〉 + |101000〉
+ |011011〉+ |100100〉 + |001010〉
+ |110101〉+ |001100〉 + |110011〉
+ |011110〉+ |100001〉)
]
, (1)
which is rewritten as
|Υ〉 = 1
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[(
|0000〉 − |0101〉 − |1010〉 + |1111〉
)
⊗
∣∣∣φ+〉
+
(
|0001〉 + |0100〉 + |1011〉 + |1110〉
)
⊗
∣∣∣ψ+〉
+
(
|0110〉 − |0011〉 − |1001〉 + |1100〉
)
⊗
∣∣∣φ−〉
+
(
|0010〉 + |0111〉 − |1000〉 − |1101〉
)
⊗
∣∣∣ψ−〉
]
, (2)
where
∣∣∣φ±〉 = 1√
2
(
|00〉 ± |11〉
)
,
∣∣∣ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(
|01〉 ± |10〉
)
, (3)
are four Bell states. The prerequisites of the protocol are:
1. Suppose that Alice and Bob have the secret data X and
Y respectively, and that the binary representations of X
and Y are (x1, x2, . . . , xN) and (y1, y2, . . . , yN) respec-
tively, where x j, y j ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}, hence
X =
∑N
j=1 x j2
j−1, Y =
∑N
j=1 y j2
j−1.
2. Alice (Bob) divides the binary representation of X(Y)
into ⌈N/2⌉ groups:
G1A,G
2
A, . . . ,G
⌈ N
2
⌉
A
(G1B,G
2
B, . . . ,G
⌈ N
2
⌉
B
). (4)
Each group Gi
A
(Gi
B
) includes two bits, where i =
1, 2, . . . , ⌈N/2⌉ throughout this protocol. If N mod
2 = 1, Alice (Bob) adds one 0 into the last group
G
⌈N/2⌉
A
(G
⌈N/2⌉
B
).
3. Alice and Bob generate the shared key sequences
{K1
A
,K2
A
, . . . ,K
⌈N/2⌉
A
} and {K1
B
,K2
B
, . . . ,K
⌈N/2⌉
B
} through
a QKD protocol, where Ki
A
,Ki
B
∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. Sim-
ilarly, Alice(Bob) and TP generate the shared key se-
quence {K1
AC
, K2
AC
,. . ., K
⌈N/2⌉
AC
} ({K1
BC
, K2
BC
,. . ., K
⌈N/2⌉
BC
}),
where Ki
AC
,Ki
BC
∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}.
4. Alice, Bob and TP agree on the following coding rules:
|0〉 ↔ 0, |1〉 ↔ 1, |φ+〉 ↔ 00, |φ−〉 ↔ 11, |ψ+〉 ↔ 01,
and |ψ−〉 ↔ 10.
The steps of the protocol are as follows:
1. TP prepares ⌈N/2⌉ copies of the highly entangled six-
qubit genuine state |Υ〉, and marks them by
∣∣∣Υ(p11, p21, p31, p41, p51, p61)
〉
,
∣∣∣Υ(p12, p22, p32, p42, p52, p62)
〉
,
. . . ,
∣∣∣Υ(p1⌈N/2⌉, p2⌈N/2⌉, p3⌈N/2⌉, p4⌈N/2⌉, p5⌈N/2⌉, p6⌈N/2⌉)
〉
,
(5)
in turn to generate an ordered sequence, where the sub-
scripts 1, 2, . . . , ⌈N/2⌉ denote the order of the highly
entangled six-qubit genuine states in the sequence,
and the superscripts 1,2,3,4,5,6 denote six particles in
one state. Then TP takes the first two particles out
from
∣∣∣Υ(p1
i
, p2
i
, p3
i
, p4
i
, p5
i
, p6
i
)
〉
to construct the new se-
quence
p11, p
2
1, p
1
2, p
2
2, . . . , p
1
⌈N/2⌉, p
2
⌈N/2⌉, (6)
and denotes it as S A. Similarly, he takes out the third
and fourth particles to construct another new sequence
p31, p
4
1, p
3
2, p
4
2, . . . , p
3
⌈N/2⌉, p
4
⌈N/2⌉, (7)
and denotes it as S B. The remaining particles construct
another new sequence
p51, p
6
1, p
5
2, p
6
2, . . . , p
5
⌈N/2⌉, p
6
⌈N/2⌉, (8)
denoted as S C .
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2. TP prepares two sets of decoy photons in which each
decoy photon is chosen randomly from the single-
particle states |0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉 (|±〉 = 1/
√
2 (|0〉 ± |1〉)).
Then he inserts randomly the two sets of decoy pho-
tons into S A and S B, respectively, and records the in-
sertion positions. Finally, he denotes the two new gen-
erated sequences as S ∗
A
and S ∗
B
, and sends them to Al-
ice and Bob, respectively.
3. After receiving S ∗
A
and S ∗
B
, TP and Alice(Bob) use the
decoy photons in S ∗
A
and S ∗
B
to judge whether eaves-
droppers exist in quantum channels. The error rate ex-
ceeding the predetermined threshold will lead to the
termination and restart of the protocol, otherwise the
protocol proceeds to the next step.
4. Alice(Bob) measures the two particles marked by
p1
i
, p2
i
(p3
i
, p4
i
) in S A(S B) with Z basis ({|0〉 , |1〉}), and
denotes the binary numbers corresponding to the mea-
surement results as Mi
A
(Mi
B
). Then, Alice(Bob) calcu-
lates Gi
A
⊕ Mi
A
⊕ Ki
AC
⊕ Ki
A
(Gi
B
⊕ Mi
B
⊕ Ki
BC
⊕ Ki
B
),
and marks the calculation results by Ri
A
(Ri
B
). Finally,
Alice(Bob) announces Ri
A
(Ri
B
) to TP.
5. After receiving Ri
A
(Ri
B
), TP performs Bell measure-
ments on the particles marked by p5
i
, p6
i
, and marks the
binary numbers corresponding to the measurement re-
sults by Mi
C
. Then, he calculates Ri
A
⊕Ri
B
⊕Ki
AC
⊕Ki
BC
⊕
Mi
C
, and marks the calculation results by Ri. Finally,
he announces Ri to Alice and Bob.
6. After receiving Ri, Alice and Bob calculate Ri ⊕ KiA ⊕
Ki
B
, respectively, and mark the calculation results by
R′
i
. If R′
i
= 00 (i.e., each classical bits in R′
i
is 0),
they conclude that their data X and Y are the same.
Otherwise, they conclude that X and Y are different
and stop the comparison.
3 Information leakage problem
In this section, we will show that the protocol is insecure
under Wu et al.’s active attack means: a malicious partici-
pant can steal the secret information of another by forging
identities. We will then propose a passive attack means by
which the malicious participant can also steal the secret in-
formation of another.
3.1 Information leakage under Wu et al.’s ac-
tive attack
Let us now show how a malicious participant steal an-
other’s secret information by using Wu et al.’s active attack.
Without losing generality, we assume that Bob is malicious.
He can steal Alice’s secret data through the following steps:
1. In the second step of Ji and Ye’s protocol, when TP
sends the particle sequence S ∗
A
to Alice, Bob intercepts
all the particles in the sequence, and then he pretends
to be Alice and tells TP that he has received all the
particles.
2. Bob continues to pretends to be Alice and completes
eavesdropping checking with TP. Then he performs
single-particle measurements on the particles marked
by p1
i
, p2
i
in S A, and denotes the binary numbers corre-
sponding to the measurement results as Mi
AB
. Finally,
TP denotes the particle sequence after measurements
as S 1
A
.
3. Similar to the second step of Ji and Ye’s protocol, Bob
prepares a set of decoy photons, and then inserts ran-
domly them into S 1
A
. The new generated sequence is
denoted as S 1∗
A
. Finally, Bob pretends to be TP and
send S 1∗
A
to Alice.
4. After confirming that Alice has received S 1∗
A
, Bob con-
tinues to pretends to be TP and completes eavesdrop-
ping checking with Alice. If there is no eavesdropping,
according to the protocol procedures, Alice measures
each particle in S 1
A
with Z basis, and denotes the bi-
nary numbers corresponding to the measurement re-
sults as Mi
A
(obviously, Mi
A
is the same as Mi
AB
, i.e.,
Mi
A
= Mi
AB
). Then she calculatesGi
A
⊕Mi
A
⊕Ki
AC
⊕Ki
A
,
and marks the calculation results by Ri
A
. Finally, Alice
announces Ri
A
to TP. Similarly, Bob announces Ri
B
to
TP after completing measurements and calculations in
accordance with the protocol procedures.
5. According to the protocol procedures, TP completes
measurements, calculations and publishes Ri to Alice
and Bob. After receiving Ri, Bob can calculate
Ri ⊕ KiBC ⊕ MiC ⊕ RiB ⊕ KiA ⊕ MiAB
=(RiA ⊕ RiB ⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiBC ⊕ MiC) ⊕ KiBC ⊕ MiC ⊕ RiB
⊕ KiA ⊕ MiAB
=RiA ⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiA ⊕ MiAB
=(GiA ⊕ MiA ⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiA) ⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiA ⊕ MiAB
=GiA. (9)
Note here that Mi
A
= Mi
AB
, and Bob can deduce Mi
C
from Eq. 1 based on Mi
AB
and Mi
B
. From the above
equation, Bob can obtain Gi
A
through the calculation,
thus he can deduce Alice’s secret data X.
We have shown that Wu et al.’s active attack is also ef-
fective for Ji and Ye’s protocol, that is, their protocol will
leak information under Wu’s active attack. In addition, we
find that the protocols presented in Refs. [44–46] also have
such an information leakage problem, because the process
of these protocols is similar to that of Ji and Ye’s protocol.
In what follows, we will present a passive attack means,
by which we will show that a malicious participant can eas-
ily steal the secret data of another based on his own secret
data after the end of the protocol, instead of using Wu et
al.’s active attack means.
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3.2 Information leakage under the proposed
passive attack
At the end of the protocol, both Alice and Bob obtain
Gi
A
⊕ Gi
B
(i.e., R′
i
), that is,
R′i = Ri ⊕ KiA ⊕ KiB
= (RiA ⊕ RiB ⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiBC ⊕ MiC) ⊕ (KiA ⊕ KiB)
=
[
(GiA ⊕ MiA ⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiA) ⊕ (GiB ⊕ MiB ⊕ KiBC ⊕ KiB)
⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiBC ⊕ MiC
] ⊕ (KiA ⊕ KiB)
= (GiA ⊕ GiB) ⊕ (MiA ⊕ MiB ⊕ MiC)
= GiA ⊕ GiB. (10)
In this case, Alice and Bob can easily steal each other’s data.
Specifically, Alice(Bob) can calculate R′
i
⊕Gi
A
(R′
i
⊕Gi
B
), thus
she(he) can get Gi
B
(Gi
A
), that is, R′
i
⊕ Gi
A
= (Gi
A
⊕ Gi
B
) ⊕
Gi
A
= Gi
B
[R′
i
⊕ Gi
B
= (Gi
A
⊕ Gi
B
) ⊕ Gi
B
= Gi
A
]. In fact,
for a cryptography protocol, the process, prerequisites, and
coding rules of the protocol are all public, except that the
keys generated in the protocol is confidential. Therefore,
Alice and Bob, as participants, will surely know that the
final comparison result is Gi
A
⊕ Gi
B
.
We find that the protocols in Refs. [43, 45–48] also have
such information leakage problem. In these protocols, both
Alice and Bob obtain Gi
A
⊕ Gi
B
at the end of the protocol,
thus they can easily know each other’s data.
4 New solution to the information
leakage problem
We have proposed a passive attack means, and described
the information leakage problem of several QPC protocols
under this attack. Indeed, the information leakage problem
is the same as that under Wu et al.’s active attack, i.e., two
participants can steal each other’s secret data. To solve this
problem,Wu et al. put forward two solutions, which is men-
tioned in the introduction. In what follows, we will propose
a new solution to the information leakage problem, and then
we will briefly compare our solution with that of Wu et al.
We will finally make some relevant comments.
4.1 The proposed solution
Let us now describe our solution. For simplicity and clar-
ity, we change directly the steps 5 and 6 of Ji and Ye’s pro-
tocol as follows (the first four steps of the protocol remain
unchanged):
5 After receiving Ri
A
(Ri
B
), TP performs Bell measure-
ments on the particles marked by p5
i
, p6
i
, and marks
the binary numbers corresponding to the measurement
results by Mi
C
. Subsequently, TP calculates Ri
A
⊕ Ri
B
⊕
Ki
AC
⊕ Ki
BC
⊕ Mi
C
, and marks the calculation results by
a1
i
a2
i
(note that each calculation result is a binary num-
ber containing two bits, i.e., a1
i
a2
i
∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}).
Then, TP calculates
⌈N/2⌉∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
a
j
i
, (11)
and marks the calculation result by S . Finally, he an-
nounces S to Alice and Bob.
6 After receiving S , Alice and Bob calculate Ki
A
⊕ Ki
B
,
respectively, and marks the calculation results by b1
i
b2
i
.
Then, they calculate
⌈N/2⌉∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
b
j
i
, (12)
and marks the calculation result by S ′. Finally, they
calculate S − S ′. If S − S ′ = 0, they can conclude
that their data X and Y are the same. Otherwise, they
conclude that X and Y are different.
The correctness of our solution is easy to verify. In Step
5, TP calculates Ri
A
⊕ Ri
B
⊕ Ki
AC
⊕ Ki
BC
⊕ Mi
C
, hence we get
RiA ⊕ RiB ⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiBC ⊕ MiC
=(GiA ⊕ MiA ⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiA) ⊕ (GiB ⊕ MiB ⊕ KiBC ⊕ KiB)
⊕ KiAC ⊕ KiBC ⊕ MiC
=GiA ⊕ GiB ⊕ KiA ⊕ KiB. (13)
Obviously, S =
∑⌈N/2⌉
i=1
∑2
j=1 b
j
i
(i.e., S = S ′) if and only if
Gi
A
= Gi
B
. Otherwise, S , S ′. Note here that Ki
A
and Ki
B
are
random keys generated by QKD, thus Ki
A
and Ki
B
are not all
the same (the probability that they are all the same can be
ignored because it is very small).
Similar improvements can be made to the protocols pre-
sented in Refs. [43, 45–48]. For simplicity, we would not
like to review these protocols and describe their amend-
ments.
4.2 Comparison
Let us make a brief comparison between our solution and
the ones proposed by Wu et al. In our solution, we only
change slightly the algorithm without using any additional
quantum technology and resources. On the contrary, both
the solutions proposed by Wu et al. need to consume addi-
tional quantum technology and resources, which has been
mentioned in the introduction. We show these differences
in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison with Wu et al.’s solutions.
Wu et al.’s
solution 1
Wu et al.’s
solution 2
Our
solution
additional keys
√ √ ×
hash functions
√ × ×
unitary operations × √ ×
4
4.3 Comment
In fact, in classical private comparison protocols, Alice
and Bob’s data are required to be confidential, but there is
no requirement on whether the final comparison results are
public [8]. Therefore, QPC, as the generalization of clas-
sical private comparison protocols in quantum mechanics,
does not need to add such a privacy requirement. After
all, adding this requirement will inevitably make the proto-
col more complex and increase resource consumption (e.g.,
consuming more expensive quantum devices). At present,
most QPC protocols allow the third party to publish the final
comparison result (i.e., the comparison result is public). Of
course, if there is such a requirement in reality (i.e., keeping
the comparison result private), one can design a protocol in
a similar way according to our solution.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that several QPC protocols have the same
information leakage problem underWu et al.’s active attack.
We have proposed a passive attack means, and shown that
several QPC protocols are insecure under this attack: a ma-
licious participant can easily steal another’s secret data af-
ter the end of the protocol. We have proposed a simple and
effective solution to this problem, which is more efficient
than the ones proposed by Wu et al. We have also made
some comments on this problem. We believe that our solu-
tion and comments are constructive to the design of a QPC
protocol.
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